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Playing in the Sandbox: Moral 
Development and the Duty of Care 
in Collaborations between  
For-Profit and Nonprofit 
Corporate Persons 
 
Christyne J. Vachon, Esq.*1 
 
Over the history of the corporate entity, U.S. law has 
evolved to treat the corporate entity as a legal person under the 
U.S. Constitution. Despite the increased rights granted to the 
corporation as a legal person, both for-profit and nonprofit 
corporations have come under considerable scrutiny for 
misconduct and issues related to corporate governance. When 
for-profit and nonprofit organizations collaborate together, 
however, both organizations generally seek to achieve 
philanthropic good. On the other hand, both organizations and 
their management are bound by law to fulfill specific duties to 
their individual constituents. In the 1930s, psychologist Jean 
 
  * Christyne J. Vachon is a visiting professor of law at the University of 
North Dakota, School of Law. She will continue as a tenure-eligible assistant 
professor of law in August 2013. In addition, Christyne J. Vachon is a private 
practitioner in for-profit and nonprofit law. Professor Vachon wishes to thank 
the friends and colleagues with whom she worked, including Eve Brank, Joan 
Heminway, George Kuney, and Sandi Zellmer for their support, Heather 
Williams and Daniel Murow for research assistance, and the University of 
Nebraska, Lincoln and the University of Tennessee, Knoxville for support 
during the research and writing process. 
1. This article pulls together ideas published by three leading 
researchers in their fields: JAMES E. AUSTIN, THE COLLABORATION CHALLENGE: 
HOW NONPROFITS AND BUSINESSES SUCCEED THROUGH STRATEGIC ALLIANCES 
21 (2000); Lawrence E. Mitchell, Cooperation and Constraint in the Modern 
Corporation: An Inquiry into the Causes of Corporate Immorality, 73 TEX. L. 
REV. 477 (1995); and JEAN PIAGET, THE MORAL JUDGMENT OF THE CHILD 
(Marjorie Gabain trans., 1997). Sections II through V of this article are 
substantially based on an article by Christine J. Vachon, Scratch My Back, 
and I’ll Scratch Yours: Scratching the Surface of the Duty of Care in Cross 
Sector Collaborations, 8 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 1 (2012). 
1
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Piaget noted, “[t]he good, in short, is not, like duty, the result of 
a constraint exercised by society upon the individual. The 
aspiration to the good is of different stuff from the obedience 
given to an imperative rule.”2 Guided by the basis for Piaget’s 
above assertion related to the natural person, this article 
begins an analysis of the relationship between legal persons: 
collaborating for-profit and nonprofit organizations in light of 
duty, arguing that there is a balance between too much 
constraint and none that leads to sustainability of the 
cooperative venture. 
 
I. Introduction 
 
In the 1930s, psychologist Jean Piaget noted, “[t]he good, 
in short, is not, like duty, the result of a constraint exercised by 
society upon the individual. The aspiration to the good is of 
different stuff from the obedience given to an imperative rule.”3 
Over the history of the corporate entity, U.S. law has evolved to 
treat the corporate entity as a legal person under the U.S. 
Constitution.4 As the corporate entity is assuming additional 
 
2. PIAGET, supra note 1, at 354. See also JEROME KAGAN, THE NATURE OF 
THE CHILD (1984). 
3. PIAGET, supra note 1, at 354. 
4. In 1819, the Court in Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward 
noted the corporation was an artificial person. 17 U.S. 518, 636 (1819). The 
corporate charter granted it life and could not be altered by the state. Id. In 
his concurring opinion, Justice Story noted that the corporation, “a collection 
of individuals, united under one collective body, under a special name, and 
possessing certain immunities, privileges and capacities,” has a life of its own 
and akin to a natural person. Id. at 667 (Story, J., concurring). In 1882, the 
meaning of “person” in the Fourteenth Amendment was expanded to include 
an artificial person. Cnty. of San Mateo v. S. Pac. R.R. Co., 13 F. 145, 150 
(C.C.D. Cal 1882). In 1886, the Fourteenth Amendment’s application was 
expanded to include corporations. Cnty. of Santa Clara v. S. Pac. R.R. Co., 
118 U.S. 394, 396 (1886). In 1889 the Supreme Court ruled that a corporation 
is a “person” for due process and equal protection. Minneapolis & St. Louis 
Ry. Co. v. Beckwith, 129 U.S. 26, 28 (1889). In 1893, the Court found that 
corporations have a claim under the Bill of Rights. Noble v. Union River 
Logging R.R. Co., 147 U.S. 165 (1893). In 1905, the Court invalidated 
government action against the corporation essentially for violating 
substantive due process. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). In 1906, 
the Court granted corporations Fourth Amendment “search and seizure” 
protection. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906). In 1908, the Court granted 
corporations the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial because a corporate 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol33/iss3/5
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legal protection as a legal person under the Constitution, the 
question remains whether moral and ethical standards and 
thought apply similarly to the artificial person, the corporation. 
This Article explores the moral development of the corporation 
from the perspective of Piaget’s theory of the moral 
development of the child. In particular, the Article examines 
the moral development in the setting of the cross-sector 
collaboration between a for-profit corporation and a nonprofit 
corporation along a continuum of increasing engagement. 
Cross-sector interactions between nonprofit and for-profit 
institutions through collaboration on the path to a 
philanthropic goal (“Collaboration”) take on a particularly 
unique perspective when considering the collaborators are 
actually legal persons for many situations under law. “[I]t is 
continually becoming more evident that values-based 
leadership, synergistic generation of social and economic value, 
and strategic cross-sector alliances are key ingredients to 
achieving sustainably successful business.”5 When for-profit 
and nonprofit organizations engage in collaboration, both 
organizations generally seek to achieve a philanthropic good. 
On the other hand, both organizations and their management 
are bound by law to fulfill specific duties. Although the goal of 
the Collaboration is to promote the philanthropic mission of the 
nonprofit, each organization enters the collaboration with its 
own goals, hoping to gain from opportunities offered by other 
collaborators. Guided by the basis for Piaget’s above assertion, 
this article begins an analysis of the relationship between 
collaborating for-profit and nonprofit organizations in light of 
duty and moral decision making, and discovers that a medium 
ground of regulation may allow both entities to achieve their 
 
defendant was considered the “accused.” Armour Packing Co. v. Lacy, 200 
U.S. 226 (1906). In 1922, the Court applied the Fifth Amendment “takings 
clause” compensation for a corporation subject to a governmental regulation. 
Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922). In 1936, the Court applied the 
First Amendment right to freedom of speech to a newspaper corporation for 
tax-free sale of advertising in newspapers. Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 
U.S. 233 (1936). The law progressed in a similar manner until the Supreme 
Court’s recent decisions in Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010), and 
FCC v. AT&T, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 1177 (2011). 
5. James E. Austin & Ezequiel Reficco, Corporate Social 
Entrepreneurship, 11 INT’L J. NOT-FOR-PROFIT L. 86, 90 (2009). 
3
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moral potential. The medium ground provides flexibility and 
reliability similar to the guidance of the U.S. Constitution, of 
which corporations are increasingly granted protection. 
To aid in the analysis I adopt the premise of a continuum 
of engagement set forth by James Austin (the “Continuum”) 
and applied in the analysis of my article Scratch My Back.6 
Under this premise, for-profits and nonprofits engage in 
collaborations at various levels along a Continuum. For 
example, on a basic level, a for-profit may simply make a 
donation to a nonprofit. On the other hand, a nonprofit and a 
for-profit may achieve more collective action on a regular basis 
and have integrated aspects of the businesses. 
This Article provides an extended analysis of the 
Collaboration between two unaffiliated entities, the nonprofit 
and the for-profit, building off of my conclusions in Scratch My 
Back.7 In Part II, this article briefly sets forth the background 
for and my argument in Scratch My Back that in order for the 
Collaboration to survive and fulfill the goals of both entities, 
the more integrated the Collaboration becomes, the more the 
for-profit needs to consider monitoring and assisting with the 
management of the nonprofit to fulfill its duty of care in 
decision making and oversight of the nonprofit. With an aim to 
better understand the unique relationship between a for-profit 
and nonprofit in Collaboration, this Article discusses the 
potential for application to this analysis of psychologist Jean 
Piaget’s theory of the moral development of the child through 
the influence of constraint and cooperation.8 
In Part III, this Article provides a general description of 
Jean Piaget’s theory of moral development of the child and 
applies it to the analysis of the duty of care of the management 
of the for-profit and the nonprofit in the Collaboration along 
 
6. Vachon, supra note 1. 
7. There are other relationships between for-profits and nonprofits, but 
this paper does not seek to provide an analysis of corporate governance that 
is equally applicable to those relationships. For instance, in a situation where 
a for-profit has a subsidiary nonprofit, it is well recognized that the fiduciary 
duty analysis of a parent-subsidiary relationship applies a modified standard. 
See, e.g., Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717 (Del. 1971). 
8. PIAGET, supra note 1. “Although, humans do not seem to be specially 
programmed for a particular profile of moral missions, they are prepared to 
invent and believe in some ethical mission.” KAGAN, supra note 2, at 153. 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol33/iss3/5
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the Continuum. Lawrence E. Mitchell, in his article 
Cooperation and Constraint in the Modern Corporation: An 
Inquiry into the Causes of Corporate Immorality, applied 
Piaget’s moral development theory to corporations as a 
cooperative enterprise.9 Recognizing the goal of a Collaboration 
to promote good and that Piaget’s theory offers an ideal model 
for promoting moral thinking in children, I will extend the 
application of Piaget’s moral development theory to an analysis 
of the Collaboration, a cooperative venture, between a 
nonprofit and for-profit. 
Piaget determined that children would be challenged to 
develop into autonomous, moral adults with constraint, 
attributed to adults and superiors.10 Instead, if the child 
participates in cooperative games and other play involving 
those who are equals to the child, such as games in a sandbox, 
they are more likely to develop into moral adults respecting 
others, recognizing good through independent thought than as 
a duty imposed by adults.11 At play, as in a sandbox, the child 
learns to perceive his own moral autonomy and, in turn, to 
respect and value the autonomy of others.12 
Along this line, Jean Piaget’s theory of a child’s moral 
development sheds light on the need for a relationship of 
mutual respect and equity between the nonprofit and the for-
profit as they play in the Collaboration sandbox. As Mitchell so 
clearly articulated in his article Cooperation and Constraint in 
the Modern Corporation: An Inquiry into the Causes of 
Corporate Immorality, “[Piaget] saw implications for social 
structure in his findings on the development of morality-
implications that are equally applicable to the corporation.”13 
Although the study of Piaget’s insights cannot definitively 
resolve the challenges of corporate governance, they can 
provide guidance, especially since the underlying activities of 
the collaborating entities are governed by natural persons.14 
Indeed, from this analysis, no conclusion should be drawn that 
 
9. Mitchell, supra note 1. 
10. See generally, PIAGET, supra note 1. 
11. Id. 
12. Id. at 94-95. See also Mitchell, supra note 1. 
13. Mitchell, supra note 1, at 493. 
14. Id. at 493, 499. 
5
  
1050 PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33:3 
either the nonprofit or the for-profit is equated with a child. 
Instead, this Article applies Piaget’s theory to the 
Collaboration because, as with Piaget’s premise, the 
Collaboration seeks to promote good but offers potential for a 
situation of inequity or equity, unilateral respect or mutual 
respect, and constraint or cooperation. 
This Article suggests that the duty of care requires finding 
the right balance between constraint and unilateralism, and 
cooperation and mutual respect in interactions between the 
collaborating parties, and, in the future, may be influenced 
positively or negatively by law makers depending on the 
approach they take towards constraint or encouraging 
cooperation. These decisions will have corresponding 
implications for the development and growth of the 
Collaboration along the Continuum. 
 
II. Intertwined Duty of Care 
 
The nonprofit and for-profit are intended to be different 
types of organizations, and, despite increasing blurring of the 
distinctions between the two entities, continue, to a certain 
degree, to maintain some of the corresponding differences.15 
Part of any analysis of the fiduciary duties in the cooperative 
enterprise of a Collaboration, includes understanding the 
primary mission for each organization: for-profit businesses are 
organized and operated primarily for the pursuit of profit and 
gains to the shareholders, the nonprofits are organized and 
operated in pursuit of its philanthropic mission.16 
 
A. The For-Profit 
 
The for-profit is designed to emphasize one “good” over 
others. The “good” is profit maximization for the owners of the 
corporation (the shareholders), referred to as “shareholder 
 
15. Gail A. Lasprogata & Marya N. Cotten, Contemplating “Enterprise”: 
The Business and Legal Challenges of Social Entrepreneurship, 41 AM. BUS. 
L.J. 67, 73-74 (2003). 
16.  Vachon, supra note 1, at 37. 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol33/iss3/5
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primacy.”17 Today, however, shareholder primacy is still the 
norm in many jurisdictions.18 The corporation’s governance is 
the subject of state corporate law, which holds that the board 
and management owe fiduciary duties only, or primarily, to the 
shareholders. Therefore, the emphasis of management conduct 
has been on the profit motive.19 More recently, however, law 
and public opinion have recognized socially-accountable for-
profits.20 Translated, profit maximization represents the 
mission of the for-profit company, and, some argue, to the 
exclusion of the interests of stakeholders.21 Concern for social 
responsibility by management might impair the pursuit of 
profit maximization,22 which would arguably be a breach of the 
fiduciary duties to the shareholders.23 
For-profits may enter into a Collaboration with a nonprofit 
hoping that the nonprofit’s image will help to improve, enhance 
or repair the for-profit’s image.24 In this way, for-profits may 
approach the Collaboration as an opportunity to improve the 
 
17. Jonathan D. Springer, Corporate Law, Corporate Constituency 
Statutes: Hollow Hopes and False Fears, 1999 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 85, 87; see 
also Mitchell, supra note 1, at 501. 
18. Springer, supra note 17, at 97. 
19. See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Corporate Stakeholders: 
A Contractual Perspective, 43 U. TORONTO L.J. 401 (1993). But see Einer 
Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 733, 738 (2005) (stating that “[n]one of the fifty states has a statute that 
imposes a duty to profit-maximize or that makes profit-maximization the sole 
purpose of the corporation”). 
20. DAVID BORNSTEIN & SUSAN DAVIS, SOCIAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP: WHAT 
EVERYONE NEEDS TO KNOW 4-5 (2010). 
21. SeeMilton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business is to 
Increase Its Profits, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Sept. 13, 1970; Elizabeth A. Weeks, 
Loopholes: Opportunity, Responsibility, or Liability?, 35 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 
320, 320 (2007); HAROLD L. JOHNSON, DISCLOSURE OF CORPORATE SOCIAL 
PERFORMANCE: SURVEY, EVALUATION, AND PROSPECTS 9 (1979). 
22. Weeks, supra note 21, at 320. 
23. But see Chris Cornforth, Introduction: The Changing Context of 
Governance—Emerging Issues and Paradoxes, in THE GOVERNANCE OF PUBLIC 
AND NON-PROFIT ORGANIZATIONS: WHAT DO BOARDS DO? 1, 7-8 (Chris 
Cornforth ed., 2003) [hereinafter Cornforth]. According to the agency theory 
of compliance (the most frequently used theory in corporate governance), 
management acts for the interests of themselves rather than the 
shareholders or mission. Arguably the duty of loyalty and good faith may be 
implicated as well. Id. 
24. Alan R. Andreasen, Profits For Nonprofits: Find a Corporate Partner, 
74 HARV. BUS. REV. 47, 56 (1996). 
7
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company’s reputation, and consequently, the company’s 
relationship with its customers.25 
 
B. The Nonprofit 
 
The nonprofit is a company also created under state law 
with a philanthropic mission. Under federal law, the Internal 
Revenue Code governs tax-exempt nonprofits.26 In an economy 
of limited resources, there is abundant competition for limited 
funds for nonprofits. Consequently, nonprofits explore other 
avenues of raising funds, including entering into a 
Collaboration with a for-profit.27 
The nonprofit’s board of directors serves as the “‘guardians’ 
of the charity’s mission.”28 While the governance law applicable 
to nonprofits is underdeveloped compared to that of for-
profits,29 the IRS has taken a role to try to articulate some 
standards. In its 2008 Position Paper on Corporate 
Governance, the IRS encouraged “an active and engaged board 
believing that it is important to the success of a charity and to 
its compliance with applicable law.”30 In general, one of the 
biggest challenges faced by a nonprofit and its management is 
to keep the business focused on the intended goal(s) of the 
company.31 In fact, commercialization may be the strongest 
 
25. See id. (stating that “consumers respond to the halo effect”). 
26. Austin & Reficco, supra note 5, at 90. “Section 501 of the Internal 
Revenue Code provides several different categories of organization types for 
which tax-exempt status is an option.” Lasprogata & Cotton, supra note 15, 
at 74. 
27. Andreasen, supra note 24, at 48; Howard P. Tuckman, 
Commercialization and For-Profits in Disguise, in INTERNATIONAL 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CIVIL SOCIETY 504, 504 (2010) (indicating that a reason 
there is a growth in commercial activities by nonprofits is the serious 
challenge to raise funds); see also Lasprogata & Cotten, supra note 15, at 68. 
28. Cornforth, supra note 23, at 8. 
29. Henry B. Hansmann, Reforming Nonprofit Corporation Law, 129 U. 
PA. L. REV. 497, 500 (1981). 
30. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, GOVERNANCE AND RELATED TOPICS – 
501(C)(3) ORGANIZATIONS. § 3 (Feb. 4, 2008), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
tege/governance_practices.pdf [hereinafter IRS GOVERNANCE]. 
31. Sean Silverthorne, Achieving Excellence in Nonprofits Q&A with: 
Herman B. Leonard, HARV. BUS. SCH. (Oct. 27, 2008), 
http://hbswk.hbs.edu/item/5942.html. 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol33/iss3/5
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force shaping nonprofit business these days.32 Therefore, a 
nonprofit’s involvement in a Collaboration with a for-profit 
requires careful consideration and monitoring by the 
nonprofit’s board of directors to ensure: “1) pursuit of the 
philanthropic mission and 2) application of the profit towards 
the mission.”33 
 
C. Collaboration, Continuum, Care and Cooperation 
 
 1. The Collaboration on a Continuum 
 
With the changing business and economic climate, the 
dynamics of each type of organization are shifting. In response 
to increased funding shortages, nonprofits devise and apply 
various methods of raising funding. Some of these efforts 
resemble for-profit profit making enterprises. The for-profit 
organization may look for ways to be more philanthropic, 
moving from purely donating to a deeper involvement with a 
nonprofit.34 In general, many perceive for-profits as entering 
into Collaborations with nonprofits so they can “bask in the 
glow of their esteemed partners.”35 The Collaboration has 
become an integral part of the strategy of these organizations 
to increase their value.36 The Collaboration between the for-
profit and the nonprofit has been described as occurring on a 
Continuum, with increasing levels of integration.37 The 
Continuum is useful to understanding the varying levels of 
involvement the collaborating entities may engage in and the 
corresponding duty of care responsibilities. 
The Continuum sets forth various descriptive stages in 
 
32. Dennis R. Young et al., Commercialization, Social Ventures, & For-
Profit Competition, in THE STATE OF NONPROFIT AMERICA 521, 522 (2012). 
33. Vachon, supra note 1, at 22. 
34. Lasprogata & Cotten, supra note 15, at 96; Martha Minow, Partners, 
Not Rivals?: Redrawing the Lines Between Public and Private, Nonprofit and 
Profit, and Secular and Religious, 80 B.U. L. REV. 1061, 1066 (2000). 
35. Andreasen, supra note 24, at 50. 
36. See Austin & Reficco, supra note 5, at 89. 
37. James Austin, Strategic Collaboration Between Nonprofits and 
Businesses, 29 HARV. BUS. SCH. NONPROFIT & VOLUNTARY SECTOR Q. 69, 71 
(2000), available at http://nvs.sagepub.com/content/29/suppl_1/69 [hereinafter 
Austin Collaboration]. 
9
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which a nonprofit and for-profit may collaborate at increasing 
levels of involvement. James Austin in “The Collaboration 
Challenge” has identified three stages on the Continuum: the 
philanthropic stage, the transactional stage, and the 
integrative stage.38 “The characteristics ascribed to each stage 
appear in gradations as a multifaceted relationship evolves 
incrementally from one stage into another.”39 The deeper the 
engagement, the more important the Collaboration becomes to 
the collaborating entities, from “peripheral to strategic” as the 
resources devoted to the Collaboration by each entity and risk 
of loss increase.40 Importantly, the more a collaborating entity 
has at stake in the Collaboration, the more the management of 
that entity should be involved to effectuate their fiduciary 
duties. 
 
 2. Duty of Care Intertwined 
 
To accomplish effective implementation and continuation 
of the Collaboration, both entities should be aware of the 
possible corporate governance issues posed by the 
Collaboration. As I discussed in Scratch My Back, the deeper 
along the Continuum the Collaboration goes, the more these 
corporate governance issues can affect each entity’s 
sustainability, and the viability and productivity of the 
Collaboration.41 
In a Collaboration where the for-profit has stronger 
financial capabilities, more resources (e.g., employees), and 
more business acumen, its involvement with the nonprofit may 
have a negative influence on the management of the Nonprofit, 
causing attention and efforts to move away from the 
philanthropic mission. Negative impacts such as these can 
cause the nonprofit to experience mission drift. Mission drift 
 
38. As James E. Austin described in The Collaboration Challenge the 
cross sector interaction tends to follow a specific collaboration continuum 
wherein each stage of the continuum has specific identifying characteristics. 
AUSTIN, supra note 1, at 20, 34. The three stages in the continuum are 
philanthropic stage, transactional stage, and integrative stage. Id. 
39. Id. at 35. 
40. Id. at 34. 
41. See id.; Vachon, supra note 1, at 28-30. 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol33/iss3/5
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occurs when the original philanthropic mission of the nonprofit 
is no longer the focus of management’s efforts.42 Instead, the 
philanthropic goal has been partially or wholly replaced by 
something much more akin to for-profit interest.43 
The Continuum does not require that one stage happen 
before another, nor does the Collaboration have to proceed 
further along the Continuum. It can stay in one stage or even 
regress. The board of director’s involvement increases the 
deeper into the Continuum. At the first stage in the 
Continuum, the philanthropic stage, the board of directors and 
other management of both entities are usually not very 
involved, if at all.44 The deeper into the Collaboration along the 
Continuum, the harder it may be for the nonprofit 
management to thwart mission drift. In Scratch My Back, I 
argue that due to the threat of mission drift in the 
Collaboration, the nonprofit’s activities in the Collaboration 
and the effect of the Collaboration on the nonprofit need to be 
carefully monitored and evaluated by the management of both 
collaborating entities depending on where the Collaboration is 
on the Continuum. In Scratch My Back, I urge that the 
management of a collaborating for-profit has an obligation to 
ensure the care and sustainability of the nonprofit because 
their duty of care to the for-profit requires it. I urged that this 
premise depends on two factors: (1) how far the Collaboration is 
situated along the Continuum, and (2) a recognition that the 
further along the Continuum, if failure happens, increasingly 
negative taint will attach to both parties. First, by being 
informed, they will understand that the deeper into the 
Continuum the more both entities have invested in the success 
 
42. See Cornforth, supra note 23, at 7-8 (Traditionally, the board is 
viewed as protecting the nonprofit’s mission.); Tuckman, supra note 27, at 
506. 
43. See Tuckman, supra note 27, at 506; Young et al., supra note 32, at 
542-43 (provides various examples of mission drift—nonprofits compromised 
by for-profit considerations). See also Estelle James, Commercialism and the 
Mission of Nonprofits, 40 SOC. J. 29, 29 (2003) (“So long as the charitable goal 
of the nonprofit remains the driving force, such commercialization has a 
positive impact on the finances and long-term stability of the organization 
and the sector.”); Tuckman, supra note 27, at 506; Lasprogata & Cotten, 
supra note 15, at 86. 
44. AUSTIN, supra note 1, at 20. 
11
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of the Collaboration. Second, the success of the Collaboration is 
contingent upon the sustainability of both collaborating 
organizations.45 
Mission drift may result in failure of the nonprofit. If the 
nonprofit fails, so too does the Collaboration. Consequently, the 
nonprofit’s sustainability determines the success of the for-
profit’s engagement in the Collaboration. The success of the 
Collaboration determines the success of the business decision 
by the for-profit to enter into the Collaboration to achieve its 
articulated goals, such as goodwill. Knowing that the 
sustainability of the nonprofit determines the sustainability of 
the Collaboration, and therefore the success of the for-profit’s 
decision, the for-profit management, I argue, must determine 
the level of care owed by both entities to ensure the success of 
the investment in the Collaboration which may include 
ensuring the sustainability of the nonprofit.46 
As I argued in Scratch My Back, as the Collaboration 
continues to develop, and depending on the form of 
Collaboration, the management of both entities will need to 
become more involved,47 and especially, to evaluate the impact 
the Collaboration will have on each of their companies and the 
overall impact on the mission of the nonprofit.48 In this way, 
the collaborators need to be vigilant to ensure that the 
commercialization pressures of the Collaboration, and the time 
and activities allocated to the Collaboration at any point along 
the Continuum do not erode and/or erase the nonprofit’s 
mission and values.49 For example, over the years The 
Timberland Company (“Timberland”) and City Year, Inc. (“City 
 
45. Vachon, supra note 1, at 28-29. 
46. Austin & Reficco, supra note 5, at 90 (explaining that at the 
integrative stage, there is at least one example where the for-profit held a 
seat on the nonprofit partner’s board of directors and had become engaged in 
the governance of that partner); Vachon, supra note 1, at 11-12. 
47. Vachon, supra note 1, at 12 (citing AUSTIN, supra note 1, at 60, 77, 
85). 
48. AUSTIN, supra note 1, at 60, 77, 85. See Vachon, supra note 1, at 29. 
49. Tuckman, supra note 27, at 506; Young et al., supra note 32, at 542-
43. See James, supra note 43, at 29 (“So long as the charitable goal of the 
Nonprofit remains the driving force, such commercialization has a positive 
impact on the finances and long term stability of the organization and the 
sector.”). But see Lasprogata & Cotten, supra note 15, at 86. 
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol33/iss3/5
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Year”) have evolved their collaboration into a more and more 
integrated cooperative enterprise; however, the contact started 
with a cold call from City Year to Timberland asking for a 
donation of fifty pairs of boots to be part of a uniform for City’s 
Year’s youth corps.50 Over time, the two entities became more 
integrated in the Collaboration. In 1994, the chief operating 
officer of Timberland was named chairman of the board of 
directors of City Year; and in 1995, Timberland created a new 
line of apparel called City Year Gear.51 Timberland’s Vice 
President of Human Resources provides guidance to City Year 
on structuring staff pay plans and labor policies.52 In 2000, City 
Year started its first non-urban corps out of the same building 
where Timberland has its headquarters in New Hampshire.53 
The Collaborators will need to be able to recognize the pull 
of Collaboration commercialization that benefits the nonprofit’s 
mission and Collaboration commercialization that distorts it.54 
Distortion would result in mission drift.55 Some claim that one 
of the biggest challenges confronting the nonprofit is mission 
drift.56 This is particularly relevant with regards to a nonprofit 
that engages in a Collaboration with a for-profit particularly as 
they move along the Continuum towards the integrative stage. 
If the Collaboration has reached the integrative stage and fails, 
both parties will likely carry the taint of a failed to 
Collaboration to a greater or lesser extent, especially if one 
party to the venture failed ethically, or in the case of the 
nonprofit, mission drift occurred.57 
 
 
 
 
50. AUSTIN, supra note 1, at 21. See also Susan Nickbarg, Anatomy of a 
Partnership: City Year & Timberland Branding/Rebranding, P.R. NEWS 72-
74 (Dec. 12, 2012), available at 
http://www.prnewsonline.com/Assets/File/PRNTop100sample.pdf. 
51. AUSTIN, supra note 1, at 27. 
52. Id. at 28. 
53. Nickbarg, supra note 50, at 72. 
54. Vachon, supra note 1, at 24. See James, supra note 43, at 29. 
55. Cornforth, supra note 23, at 7-8; Vachon, supra note 1, at 24. 
56. Silverthorne, supra note 31. 
57. Vachon, supra note 1, at 29-31. 
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 3. A Cooperative Enterprise 
 
Before a discussion of how Piaget’s theory of moral 
development and emphasis on cooperation and mutual respect 
shed light on the corporate governance issues of a 
Collaboration, it is important to note that the Collaboration is, 
in varying degrees along the Continuum, a cooperative 
enterprise. It has been argued that the corporation is a 
cooperative association based on the cooperative enterprise 
model centered “around the achievement of certain goals.”58 In 
the current example of a Collaboration, this type of cooperation 
evidences itself with members from each organization working 
to achieve the goals of the Collaboration, including promoting 
the philanthropic mission. A Collaboration is a cooperative 
enterprise, but it is even more so when the duty of care is 
intertwined such that the for-profit too should ensure that the 
nonprofit management is fulfilling its duty of care. 
As Mitchell articulated, the common goal that determines 
a common enterprise may be a goal that is narrow and specific, 
such as a nonprofit and for-profit collaborating to host a road 
race, to something more general and sweeping, such as a 
nonprofit and for-profit working together to achieve improved 
global literacy.59 The concept that should be considered is what 
underlying principles hold the Collaboration together. Mitchell 
cites to the two models set forth by Lon Fuller in Two 
Principles of Human Association.60 The two models are based 
on two different principles: the legal principle and the shared 
commitment principle.61 An association marked by the legal 
principle tends to have greater formality and structure. Fuller 
described the association as premised on “rules of duty and 
entitlement.”62 An association of the type known as the shared 
 
58. Mitchell, supra note 1, at 481-83 (recognizing that a second model of 
cooperative enterprise may also apply, that of emphasis on shared interest in 
the process or activity). 
59. Id. at 484 (identifying characteristics of a common goal). 
60. Lon L. Fuller, Two Principles of Human Association, in VOLUNTARY 
ASSOCIATIONS 6 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1969). See 
Mitchell, supra note 1, at 484-85. 
61. Fuller, supra note 60, at 6. 
62. Id. at 8. 
14http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol33/iss3/5
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commitment principle characteristically provides a way for 
voluntary association based on common value(s) or goal(s).63 A 
church or charitable organization is a good example of an 
association convened under the shared commitment principle. 
Fuller finds that the majority of human associations have 
elements of both principles, shared commitment and legal; 
however, once the legal principle asserts itself, it tends to 
dominate over the shared commitment principle, tainting the 
shared commitment characteristic with a set structure of 
responsibilities and powers.64 
While a for-profit, and even a nonprofit may arguably be 
considered more an association based on the legal principle 
than a shared commitment principle, a Collaboration between 
the two at the start may be founded very strongly on the 
shared commitment principle.65 The entities come together to 
achieve the goals of the Collaboration, a shared project to 
further the philanthropic mission of the nonprofit, while 
recognizing that each entity has its own individual interests in 
engaging in the cooperative enterprise. This is similar to a 
group of individuals working on a cooperative enterprise, such 
as building a bridge. Each person has the common goal of 
building the bridge, but each individual has their own 
interests, such as getting paid, health care, or other benefits. 
 
III. The Psychology of the Collaboration 
 
A successful Collaboration requires cooperation, mutual 
respect, and equality in order to ensure sustainability, attain 
the good sought, and benefit both organizations. Psychologist 
Jean Piaget’s theory of the moral development of the child, by 
indirect analogy, helps to shed light on the unique 
characteristics of the Collaboration. The dominant theme from 
Piaget’s moral development research was that children would 
not develop into autonomous and morally responsible adults 
 
63. Mitchell, supra note 1, at 485. 
64. Fuller, supra note 60, at 11-14. See Mitchell, supra note 1, at 485. 
65. Mitchell notes that although pursuit of profit alone by individuals at 
a corporation is a goal, it was not necessarily the goal as a basis for the 
shared commitment principle that Fuller had in mind. Mitchell, supra note 1, 
at 485-86. 
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without having had the experience of cooperative play and 
other child games with his equals.66 The competing 
characteristics identified by Piaget, which determine the 
ingredients for the ideal method of moral development 
(constraint versus cooperation, unilateral respect versus 
mutual respect, and equality versus inequality), also contribute 
to understanding the development of the two organizations and 
their Management in the Collaboration. 
 
A. Piaget’s Moral Development Theory 
 
As a sub-category of practical reasoning, moral reasoning 
essentially asks the questions about what to do in a particular 
situation.67 The unique characteristic of moral reasoning, as 
opposed to other types of practical reasoning, is that the 
motivation behind the reasoning is some moral principle or 
ideal.68 
 
66. Mitchell, supra note 1, at 499. However, 
 
It is meaningless, therefore, to wonder whether it is the 
cognitive cooperation (or cooperations) which engender the 
individual operations or the other way around. It is at the 
stage of concrete operations that new interpersonal 
relations of a cooperative nature are established, and there 
is no reason why these should be limited to cognitive 
exchanges. 
 
JEAN PIAGET & BARBEL INHELDER, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE CHILD 118 (1969). 
67. See Jerrold R. Coombs, Attainments of the Morally Educated Person, 
in DEVELOPMENT OF MORAL REASONING 17 (1980). “Practical reasoning 
involves two distinct kinds of reasons: (1) motivational reasons such as 
wants, purposes, or rules of conduct and (2) beliefs about what actions will 
fulfill the wants, purposes, or rules of conduct.” Id. 
68. See Coombs, supra note 67, at 17. For a moral principle to be 
defensible it must meet these standards, at a minimum: 
 
1. It must be the case that the person making the moral 
judgment can accept the moral decisions that follow from 
the principle in all cases to which it logically applies . . . . 2. 
It must be the case that if everyone acted on the principle, 
the consequences would not be disastrous . . . . 3. It must be 
the case that the principle can be publicly advocated 
without defeating the point of adopting the principle. 
16http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol33/iss3/5
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Jean Piaget was a child psychologist who, in the 1930s, 
researched the moral development of children by observing 
them playing simple social games, such as marbles, and 
published his results in The Moral Development of the Child.69 
Piaget found that the normal progression of a child’s moral 
development moved through stages and not necessarily 
characterized by specific years.70 He identified three stages of 
the child’s development of the consciousness of rules, and four 
stages of the child’s development of the practical observance of 
the rules.71 Piaget explained the three stages of the child’s 
development of the consciousness of the rules. The first stage, 
which includes the beginning of the egocentric stage, is where 
the superior adult or older child sets the rules to a child’s 
game.72 These rules are not yet perceived as coercive by the 
child because they are adopted as purely motor skills by the 
child or, as the child enters the egocentric stage, perceived 
unconsciously and as “interesting examples” of what to do 
rather than “obligatory realities.”73 During the second stage, 
which includes the bulk of the egocentric stage and the 
beginning half of the cooperating stage, the child views the 
rules as “sacred and untouchable, emanating from adults and 
lasting forever.”74 This reverence by the child to the rules of the 
 
 
 Id. at 19. 
69. PIAGET, supra note 1, at 14. In part of his work, Piaget drew from his 
contemporaries, in particular, Baldwin, Bovet, Durkheim, and Fauconnet. 
WILLIAM KAY, MORAL DEVELOPMENT: A PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDY OF MORAL 
GROWTH FROM CHILDHOOD TO ADOLESCENCE 39 (1970). 
70. PIAGET, supra note 1, at 14, 26-28. See KAGAN, supra note 2, at 117; 
MARY ANN SPENCER PULASKI, UNDERSTANDING PIAGET: AN INTRODUCTION TO 
CHILDREN’S COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT 15 (1971). “[A] ‘stage’ is held to be a way 
of looking at the world that is not implanted in the child by social agents but 
actively constructed by the child as he interacts with and tries to make sense 
of his world.” Thomas Lickona, Beyond Justice: A Curriculum For 
Cooperation, in DEVELOPMENT OF MORAL REASONING 139-40 (Donald B. 
Cochrane & Michael E. Manley-Casimir eds., 1980). 
71. See ALBERT BANDURA & RICHARD H. WALTERS, SOCIAL LEARNING AND 
PERSONALITY DEVELOPMENT 206-10 (1963), for a discussion of an opposing 
approach indicating, among other things, that “the developmental sequence 
proposed by Piaget is by no means predetermined or invariant.” 
72. PIAGET, supra note 1, at 28. 
73. Id. at 28. 
74. Id. at 28, 72 (as “imposed by his elders as a sort of Decalogue 
17
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superior has been referred to as unilateral respect, as opposed 
to mutual respect found later in the cooperation context.75 If 
someone suggests a modification to the rules, the child views 
that modification as a transgression.76 In the third and final 
stage, which ultimately results in the child’s recognition of his 
and other’s moral autonomy, the child views a rule as a law 
resulting from mutual consent, democracy.77 The child 
perceives that the rule may be altered if one is able to garner 
general opinion in favor of the alteration.78 
Piaget’s four stages of the child’s development of the 
practical observance of rules describe the child’s application of 
the rules.79 Research shows that transformation in cognitive 
abilities parallels changes in legal and political perspectives.80 
In the first stage, the child’s application is purely motor and 
individual-the child functions pursuant to his own desires and 
motor habits. At this point in the child’s perception, the concept 
of a true set of “collective rules” (rules perceived as applicable 
to other children too) does not apply since the rules the child 
 
revealed by divine beings (i.e., adults, including God . . . ”)). 
75. PIAGET & INHELDER, supra note 66, at 127. 
 
The sentiment described by Bovet constitutes only one of 
two possible forms of respect. We shall call it ‘unilateral,’ 
since it binds an inferior to a superior who is regarded as 
such, and shall distinguish it from ‘mutual respect,’ which is 
based on reciprocity of esteem. Unilateral respect, if it is 
indeed the source of the sense of duty, begets in the young 
child a morality of obedience which is characterized 
primarily by a heteronomy that declines later to make way, 
at least partially, for the autonomy characteristic of mutual 
respect. 
 
 Id. at 124. 
76. PIAGET, supra note 1, at 28. 
77. Id. See Mitchell, supra note 1, at 478. 
78. PIAGET, supra note 1, at 28. 
79. Id. at 26-27. Piaget indicates that the four stage continuum can be 
variable and “is not linear in character, and its general direction can only be 
observed by schematizing the material and ignoring the minor oscillations 
which render it infinitely complicated in detail.” Id. at 27. 
80. See Peter Scharf, The Moral Education of the Juvenile Offender: A 
Social Dilemma, in DEVELOPMENT OF MORAL REASONING 218 (1980). 
18http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol33/iss3/5
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practices are purely motor.81 The second stage, known as the 
egocentric stage, begins when the child actually receives the 
collective rules from the outside world. The child tends to 
imitate the application of the rules but does not play with 
others or try to win the game. In this sense, the child still plays 
alone, imitating others’ application of the rules with a “purely 
individual use of the examples received.”82 
Piaget referred to the third stage as “incipient 
cooperation.”83 Each child that plays the game endeavors to win 
the game. From this perspective, each child is concerned with 
“mutual control” and “unification of the rules.”84 It is only after 
this point that the game becomes social, and cooperation may 
begin.85 However, ideas about the rules continue to be rather 
ill-defined and inconsistent between children playing the same 
game with each other.86 The aim to win begins in the third 
stage. “In the third stage, [t]he thing now is not only to fight 
the other boys but also and primarily to regulate the game with 
a whole set of systematic rules which will ensure the most 
complete reciprocity in the methods used.”87 
The fourth and final stage Piaget referred to as the 
 
81. PIAGET, supra note 1, at 26 
82. Id. at 27. 
 
The studies one of us conducted on the functions of language 
in exchanges among children led to similar results. These, 
although they gave rise to the other studies mentioned, 
have, however, been far more controversial. The fact is that 
the speech of subjects between four and six (observed in 
situations in which children work, play and speak freely) is 
not intended to provide information, ask questions, etc. 
(that is, it is not socialized language), but consists rather of 
monologues or ‘collective monologues’ in the course of which 
everyone talks to himself without listening to the others 
(that is, egocentric language). 
 
PIAGET & INHELDER, supra note 66, at 120-21. 
83. PIAGET, supra note 1, at 27. 
84. Id. 
85. Id. at 46. 
86. Id. at 27. 
87. Id. at 45-46. 
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“codification of rules.”88 “Not only is every detail of procedure in 
the game fixed, but the actual code of rules to be observed is 
known to the whole society.”89 In the fourth stage, the child is 
able to clearly and uniformly articulate the rules of the game. A 
child in the third stage “plays as he reasons.”90 In the fourth 
stage, the child engages in “juridico-moral discussions,” 
discussions to learn the legislation of the game and give 
complete mastery of the rules of the game, which Piaget 
compares to “formal reasoning in general.”91 In the realm of 
moral development, the child would ultimately reach a point 
where he recognizes his own moral autonomy and that of 
others, creating a notion of reciprocal respect for individual 
autonomy.92 In the fourth stage, the child perceives the rule as 
a pronouncement of free will by mutual respecting individuals. 
This reciprocity developed through cooperative play is key to 
moral development.93 As a result, the child does not perceive 
the rule as coercive any longer and, instead, sees the rule as 
evidence of democratically-established moral law.94Based on 
the democratic nature, when the child accepts a moral principle 
at this stage, the child also views the principle as an acceptable 
guide for anyone.95 The child will not achieve this autonomous 
and moral thinking if the child is not exposed to cooperative 
play with equals.96 
For the child to reach this realization and develop 
autonomy, the atmosphere around the child must encourage 
cooperation and not constrain. When rules imposed by 
superiors constrain the child, the child will experience limited 
 
88. Id. at 27. 
89. Id. 
90. Id. at 46. 
91. Id. at 47. 
92. Mitchell, supra note 1, at 478. See also PIAGET & INHELDER, supra 
note 66, at 127 (“With advances in social cooperation and the corresponding 
operatory progress, the child arrives at new moral relationships based on 
mutual respect which lead to a certain autonomy.”). 
93. PIAGET, supra note 1, at 70. See also Lickona, supra note 70, at 140 
(“Cooperative living and learning give students this opportunity to ‘construct 
morality’ for themselves. Through class or community meetings, for example, 
they are able to create rules and solutions to problems.”). 
94. PIAGET, supra note 1, at 70. 
95. See Coombs, supra note 67, at 19. 
96. See supra note 66. 
20http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol33/iss3/5
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moral development because the rules are unilaterally applied 
and, consequently call for little autonomous thinking by the 
child. A child will be unable to develop the mutual respect from 
interacting with equals and engaging in independent thought 
necessary to follow a rule, instead, for morality sake and not 
just because it is a rule, moving beyond egocentrism.97 Piaget 
stated: “External constraint does not destroy egocentrism. It 
covers and conceals when it does not actually strengthen it.”98 
To a child in a cooperative play environment, such as in the 
sandbox, the rules are no longer sacred tradition set forth by 
superiors, the rules are now perceived as developing from 
autonomous people in cooperation with each other.99 Through a 
steady diet of cooperation, the pressure from cooperation will 
cause the child’s egocentrism to wither.100 When the child 
accepts the rule at free will, the rule becomes incorporated into 
the mind of the child based on the moral background to the 
rule, and compliance with the rule becomes spontaneous 
because it is developed from and incorporated into the child’s 
moral code.101 
It is the act of engaging in cooperation that guides the 
child to mutual respect, reciprocity and generosity.102 The key 
to this stage is cooperation among equals: “For it is of the 
essence of cooperation as opposed to social constraint that, side 
by side with the body of provisional opinion which exists in 
fact, it also allows for an ideal of what is right functionally 
 
97. PIAGET, supra note 1, at 71. Put simply: 
 
[C]onstraint prevented the child from coming to grips with 
his own moral agency and relieved him from having to 
acknowledge moral responsibility. Cooperation, on the other 
hand, produced a recognition of moral autonomy in which 
the child was able to develop a form of Kantian reciprocal 
respect for his fellows and to acknowledge and accept his 
own moral responsibility. 
 
Mitchell, supra note 1, at 478. 
98. PIAGET, supra note 1, at 71. 
99. Id. 
100. Lickona, supra note 70, at 140. 
101. PIAGET, supra note 1, at 71-72. 
102. Id. at 72. 
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implied in the very mechanism of discussion and reciprocity.”103 
 
B. Piaget’s Theory Applied to the Corporation and the 
Collaboration 
 
Society in general seems to be ideally modeled from 
Piaget’s equilibrium concepts of autonomy, cooperation and 
reciprocity.104 He appears to have seen application for his 
theory to the broader society at large.105 Characteristics of this 
model include “relatively equal and free autonomous beings 
seeking their own ends and respecting the ends of others with 
agreement on the general principle that each should have the 
opportunity to do just that and that governmental restraint is 
justified only to sustain that possibility.”106 In 1969, Richard 
Merelman was among the first to apply Piaget’s theory to 
understand the process of legal socialization. He argued that 
without the ability to apply moral reasoning, complex political 
and legal thinking is impossible.107 
The characteristics of Piaget’s model have been applied to 
corporations to offer guidance to “achieve sensible solutions.”108 
In today’s society, the corporation is taking on more and more 
characteristics of the natural person under law and is also 
comprised of natural persons that exercise the corporation’s 
decision-making functions and general oversight. Piaget’s 
theory about childhood development has been applied to 
corporations and management, finding, in general, that a 
corporation will function better and more ethically if less 
dominated and constrained by rules and laws.109 The same 
 
103. Id. at 72-73. See also Mitchell, supra note 1, at 494-95. 
104. Mitchell, supra note 1, at 500. 
105. Id. at 493; PIAGET, supra note 1, at 107 (referring to M. Bovet and 
stating “it is necessary, in order to grasp the situation, to take account of two 
groups of social and moral facts – constraint and unilateral respect on the one 
hand, cooperation and mutual respect on the other”). 
106. Mitchell, supra note 1, at 500. See also PIAGET, supra note 1, at 251-
57. 
107. See Scharf, supra note 80, at 216. 
108. Mitchell, supra note 1, at 493. 
109. Id. at 480. “[T]he relationship between managers and other 
corporate constituent groups is characterized by exactly the kind of 
dominance that Piaget found not only stifles the moral development of the 
22http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol33/iss3/5
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concept applies to management, and to a lesser extent the 
owners of the corporation, who exercise the powers, rights, and 
duties of the corporation.110 
While democratic principles have a base in corporate law, 
overall the rules of corporate law constrain the corporation. For 
a for-profit corporation, corporate law has narrowly drawn the 
legal purpose of the corporation and the individuals in the 
corporation. This constrains the actions of the corporation itself 
and those individuals (the management) who govern the 
entity.111 The current legal model of the corporation and laws of 
corporate governance, for either for-profit or nonprofit, 
recognize roles for individuals (management and shareholders) 
instead of recognizing the individual persons. This constraint 
by law-bound-roles tends to remove the “person” from the 
“corporate personhood.”112 Further, the underlying constraint 
on the for-profit is that law restricts its goal as a cooperative 
enterprise to, as discussed above, profit maximization for the 
benefit of the corporation and its owners.113 This emphasis on 
profit maximization tends to limit the management’s ability to 
choose the purposes for the corporation and, therefore, tends to 
restrain the Management, and therefore the corporation, to 
fully exercise of their moral autonomy in corporate 
governance.114 Of course considering corporate governance, the 
role of stockholders should not be overlooked. Rules of 
corporate law also constrain the powers of shareholders, 
assigning to them a very limited role in governance and, 
therefore, in the shareholders’ ability to influence the moral 
actions of the corporation.115 
 
weaker parties, but also leads the strong party to be inattentive to rationality 
and justice.” Id. at 498. 
110. Id. at 501. 
111. Id. at 497. 
112. Id. at 488. While this will lead to the obvious conclusion that 
Piaget’s model of moral development may not be directly applicable, there is 
also a less obvious conclusion that maybe efforts to dehumanize less, allowing 
more clear application of Piaget’s model and the increased opportunity for 
moral expression and autonomy. 
113. Id. at 489-90. 
114. Id. See also PULASKI, supra note 70, at 85 (discussing the difference 
between constraint based on expiatory versus equality and mutual 
cooperation). 
115. Mitchell, supra note 1, at 490. 
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It is well recognized that the moral responsibility of for-
profits and its management has been under considerable 
scrutiny. Based on Piaget’s theory, the limitation on the 
development of the moral autonomy of the corporation 
precludes management and, therefore, the corporation, from 
perceiving full moral responsibility for their acts.116 It has been 
argued that the required goal of profit maximization leads to 
immoral behavior by management, which is be detrimental to 
society and the long-term success of the corporation.117 
Therefore, applying Piaget’s theory that constraint negatively 
affects moral development of the for-profit, the lack of moral 
responsibility of the corporation and management should be 
attributed to the constraints we have placed upon it.118 By 
defining the goal of the for-profit so narrowly, laws and rules 
have constrained the corporation from behaving as an 
autonomous moral entity.119 
Legal constraints have arguably caused the corporation to 
be forever consigned to the egocentric and pre-cooperative 
stage.120 A child loses his or her physical egocentrism long 
 
116. Id. at 480. 
117. Id. at 501. 
118. Id. 
119. Id. at 480. 
 
Our concern with managerial loyalty is so central, and our 
distrust of management's motives so great, that we have 
straitjacketed managers' behavior in a way that essentially 
relieves them of moral responsibility for their actions and 
thus effectively denies their moral agency. As a 
consequence, they often do not behave as morally 
responsible actors, except in defiance of the law that 
imposes the stockholder-centric profit motive, and thus at 
their peril. 
 
Id. at 502. 
120. PIAGET & INHELDER, supra note 66, at 118 (“It is highly probable, 
then, that the social exchanges characteristic of the preoperatory level are 
precooperative; that is, at once social from the point of view of the subject and 
centered upon the child and his own activity from the point of view of the 
observer. This is precisely what one of us meant by ‘infantile egocentrism.’”). 
However, 
 
the axiom that freedom to act in the service of one’s self-
24http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol33/iss3/5
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before the child loses his or her mental egocentrism.121 With 
egocentrism, cooperation, the essential element for moral 
development, does not exist.122 The child, or the corporation in 
this case, receives the rules as “ready-made and external to 
subjective feelings,” and thus ends up reflecting the values of 
the superior by imitation and not by actually developing and 
applying its own moral thinking.123 
 
At birth, says Piaget, the infant is ‘locked in 
egocentrism.’ By this he means not that the baby 
is self-centered but that he is unaware of 
anything beyond himself. He knows nothing of 
the world apart from his immediate 
consciousness and therefore cannot at first 
distinguish himself from it or make any sense 
out of the variety of stimuli he receives from it.124 
 
We have so restricted the corporation as to essentially assign it 
the role of perpetually acting in its self-interest and to not 
consider the interests of others.125 Similar to the child, the 
constraints on the corporation and management lead the actors 
to follow the rules because they are rules, not out of sense of 
responsibility for the impact of the corporation’s conduct on 
others.126 
Mitchell suggested that the answer is to liberalize the 
constraints on the corporation so as to provide more flexibility 
 
interest is an absolute, primary good follows from neither 
logic nor observation. It is not transparently true that such 
freedom is friendlier to human nature or more conducive to 
social harmony than the ambivalent acceptance of either of 
an obligation to care for a sick relative or of an invitation to 
participate in the cooperative creation of an object of beauty. 
 
KAGAN, supra note 2, at 115-16. 
121. PULASKI, supra note 70, at 39. 
122. PIAGET & INHELDER, supra note 66, at 119 (“True cooperation does 
not exist yet, even on the level of play.”). 
123. PULASKI, supra note 70, at 81. 
124. Id. at 17. 
125. Mitchell, supra note 1, at 502. 
126. Id. at 479-80. 
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for the corporate purpose.127 If the rules were liberalized to 
allow the corporation and its interests to be defined to include 
those significantly affected by its actions, the corporation may 
develop an appreciation for its effects on the world around it.128 
Some states have enacted legislation, other constituency 
statutes, or case law which allows corporations to a greater or 
lesser extent to consider interests other than profit 
maximization for the owners and includes engaging in some 
level of Collaboration with a nonprofit.129 
Taking it one step further, Piaget’s moral development 
theory is similarly applicable to the cooperative enterprise of a 
Collaboration between a nonprofit and a for-profit. Research 
has shown that in collaborative business ventures the pattern 
of interaction affects each party’s ability to meet its goals in the 
collaborative venture.130 There are multiple considerations of 
the Collaboration in light of Piaget’s model of moral 
development. First, the moral development theory offers 
insight into the for-profit’s perspective. Arguably, a for-profit 
corporation seeking to enter into a Collaboration to pursue a 
philanthropic cause may be already working beyond the 
constraint on moral development argued by Mitchell.131 By 
 
127. Id. 
128. Id. at 503. 
129. Id. at 490-91. 
 
The first issue traditionally has been dealt with under the 
rubric of corporate social responsibility and has engendered 
debates that seem to flare up regularly. Nonetheless, this 
issue quite consistently has been resolved in favor of the 
private side of the equation, deeming even the largest and 
most widely flung corporate empire to be private, with the 
assertion that public concerns ought to be dealt with by 
public regulation external to the structure of the corporation 
itself. 
 
Id. 
130. Africa Arino & Jose de la Torre, Learning from Failure: Towards an 
Evolutionary Model of Collaborative Ventures, 9 ORG. SCI. 306, 308 (1998). 
131. PIAGET, supra note 1, at 61. “We are now definitely in the presence 
of a social reality that has rational and moral organization and is yet peculiar 
to childhood. Also we can actually put our finger upon the conjunction of 
cooperation and autonomy, which follows upon the conjunction of egocentrism 
and constraint.” Id. 
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further engaging in the cooperative business enterprise of the 
Collaboration, the for-profit may be engaging in less 
constrained play in the sandbox, outside of the constraint of the 
rule of profit maximization. In this way, the cooperative play in 
the Collaboration may, in turn, encourage broader moral 
development of the for-profit and its Management. 
Second, the moral development theory offers insight for the 
nonprofit’s perspective. As a cooperative enterprise, the 
Collaboration many times involves the nonprofit seeking funds 
from the for-profit, and maybe in need of business expertise. In 
turn, the for-profit hopes to gain the goodwill by association 
with the nonprofit. Many risks of the Collaboration failing due 
to failure of the nonprofit center on the premise that the 
nonprofit should be treated not as charity but as a true equal in 
the Collaboration.132 It has been argued that the for-profit has 
greater potential for treating the nonprofit as an inferior or a 
subordinate and thereby creating an environment of constraint. 
This commentary is not just directed at for-profit management. 
In fact, it is equally important that the nonprofit’s 
management views the nonprofit as an equal to the for-profit. 
Partners in a collaborative business enterprise tend to monitor 
the enterprise for efficiency, adaptability, and equity.133 In a 
collaborative business enterprise, equity means fair dealing for 
both parties.134 The potential dominance of the for-profit over 
the subordinate nonprofit would create an environment of 
constraint that would stunt the moral development of the 
nonprofit organization. Stunted moral development could, in 
turn, lead to activities that cause mission drift, illegal conduct, 
and other questionable practices affecting the sustainability of 
the nonprofit. 
Furthermore, if the for-profit management fulfills its duty 
of care by taking steps, as suggested above, to ensure that the 
nonprofit management is fulfilling its duty of care, a similar 
environment of constraint could be created given the potential 
for paternalistic conduct by the for-profit management in 
 
132.  Andreasen, supra note 24, at 48. Clearly, the interest in the 
wellbeing of the nonprofit should not rise to the level as to implicate a conflict 
of interest or breach of the corresponding duty of loyalty. Id. 
133. Arino & de la Torre, supra note 130, at 307. 
134. Id. 
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monitoring the nonprofit’s management. In this way, under 
Piaget’s theory, if a for-profit were to conduct itself in the 
Collaboration in this potentially dominant and oppressive 
manner, commanding unilateral respect, the nonprofit’s 
development in the Collaboration may suffer. This could affect 
its moral autonomy, thereby implicating mission drift. Mission 
drift would lead to varying problems for the nonprofit, the 
worst of which includes failure of the entity, fraud, illegal 
conduct by the management, and violations of IRS regulations. 
Mitchell made a similar argument in the context of the state 
constraining the corporation. This approach is directly contrary 
to the ideal approach of Piaget’s moral development model and 
would negatively affect a corporation’s development of moral 
autonomy.135 Power imbalances may also have an impact on 
the innovative goals the partners in Collaboration seek to 
attain.136 
Similarly, as nonprofits engage in more commercialization 
through Collaboration and for-profits seek goals other than 
profit maximization through Collaboration, the law may seek 
to offer some regulation over the Collaborative activities and, 
perhaps, commercial activity of the nonprofit. This law making 
activity would involve consideration of the fiduciary duties in 
the unique relationship of the Collaboration. While there is a 
benefit to allow management flexibility and power to ensure 
the interest of the corporation are fulfilled, it is also important 
that these powers are limited. The fiduciary duties serve this 
function.137 In the scope of the Collaboration, the lawmakers 
may seek to offer guidance and constraints on the powers of 
management of both entity types as they seek to engage in 
more collaborative efforts. Efforts should be made to avoid 
heavy constraint in favor of methods to enhance cooperation 
and urging equilibrium between the two entities.138 As Mitchell 
 
135. Mitchell, supra note 1, at 500-01. 
136. See Sara Holmes & Lance Moir, Developing a Conceptual 
Framework to Identify Corporate Innovations Through Engagement with 
Non-Profit Stakeholders, 7 CORP. GOV. 414, 417 (2007) (indicating that 
innovation can decrease if one partner perceives itself as inferior). 
137. Mitchell, supra note 1, at 493. 
138. Id. at 495. Kagan explains: 
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argued in the context of the corporation’s moral development: 
“Constraint is the enemy of moral development.”139 However, 
mechanisms with a certain degree of control will help to reduce 
risk and uncertainty in the Collaboration which, in turn, 
increases trust between the parties.140 
Finally, Piaget’s theory, emphasizing that all important 
aspects of human beings’ moral development takes place in the 
early years of life of the child, can be discouraging.141 While 
Piaget’s moral development theory should be considered as 
insightful and offering guidance to consider the corporate 
governance issues of the entities in a Collaboration, other 
psychologists offer guidance on the continued moral 
 
[T]he moral primacy of this view of individual freedom has a 
ring of validity to almost all citizens in our society because, 
despite ideological pluralism on many issues, there is a 
consensus that there should be minimal restraint on one’s 
willed efforts to improve one’s talents and to attain wealth 
and status. 
 
KAGAN, supra note 2, at 115 
139. Mitchell, supra note 1, at 497 (1995). Pulaski says: 
 
Adult authority is not sufficient to create in children a true 
sense of justice. As Piaget points out, this is a situation 
which is not in equilibrium and therefore cannot be stable. 
The adult is strong and demanding; the child feels weak and 
inferior. Unilateral respect leads only to moral constraint. 
The factor essential to moral development is mutual respect 
and cooperation – “cooperation between children to begin 
with, and the between child and adult as the child 
approaches adolescence, and comes, secretly at least, to 
consider himself as the adult’s equal. 
 
PULASKI, supra note 70, at 40. 
140. See Lauren C. Johnson, Understanding the Role of Cross-Sector 
Strategic Alliances in the Age of Corporate Social Responsibility (Apr. 12, 
2005) (unpublished M.A. thesis, Fletcher School, Tufts University) (on file 
with Tufts Digital Library, Tufts University), available at 
http://hdl.handle.net/10427/35290 (indicating that it is important to align 
government policies with cross-sector codes of conduct to improve corporate 
social performance through learning). 
141. Carl Goldberg, Swords into Plowshares: The Recovery Ethics of 
Destructive Adult Development, in HANDBOOK OF ADULT DEVELOPMENT 494 
(Jack Demick & Carrie Andreoletti eds., 2003). 
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development of an individual and, therefore, would similarly 
offer insight into the evolution in the Collaboration. In fact, the 
human brain continues to develop through a child’s adolescence 
and into his or her early twenties.142 Research has shown that 
the brain matures until about the age of twenty-five.143 The 
corporation, however, is always changing. While the adults in 
the organization may have mature brains, the mix of adults 
continues to flow, providing different perspectives on morals, if 
allowed. 
Studies have shown overwhelmingly that during the 
second decade of life, adolescents view adults as the legitimate 
regulators of moral issues through rules.144 Programs in schools 
have observed that the moral development of the adolescents is 
continuing and, therefore, have underscored the importance of 
educating adolescents for citizenship and participation in 
democracy.145 For instance, schools may integrate service 
programs into the adolescent’s experience. This allows them to 
experience the service, reflect on it, and engage in discussion. 
The idea behind this aspect of education comes from the belief 
that it can lead to increased moral commitment overall.146 
Some research has shown that a human being forms the actual 
understanding of the moral underpinnings of society in 
adolescence and starts to make “principled moral judgments” in 
late adolescence.147 Some of the theories of adolescent moral 
development rest, at least in part, on the understanding that 
changes in adolescent moral thought are tied to the 
 
142. See THE TEEN BRAIN: STILL UNDER CONSTRUCTION, NATIONAL 
INSTITUTE OF MENTAL HEALTH 2, 3 (2011). 
143. Claudia Wallis et al., What Makes Teens Tick, TIME, May 10, 2004, 
at 56. See also Terrance Sandalow, The Moral Responsibilities of Universities, 
in MORAL VALUES AND HIGHER EDUCATION: A NOTION AT RISK 149, 168-69 
(Dennis L. Thompson ed., 1991) (discussing the importance of universities in 
the moral development of the students). 
144. Judith G. Smetana & Elliot Turiel, Moral Development during 
Adolescence, in BLACKWELL HANDBOOK OF ADOLESCENCE 247, 257 (Gerald R. 
Adams & Michael D. Berzonsky eds., 2003) (indicating that adolescence 
recognition of adult authority is contextually bound: parents are the 
authorities outside of school, teachers and administrators are the authorities 
in school). 
145. Id. at 260. 
146. Id. at 262. 
147. Id. at 248 (citing to research conducted by Lawrence Kohlberg). 
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development of other competencies during that period of 
maturation.148 Building from Piaget’s foundation on the 
development of moral reasoning, Lawrence Kohlberg added 
that with continued moral maturation, the person 
progressively reconsiders what is morally right.149 Lawrence 
Kohlberg researched the moral development of the human 
being from childhood to adulthood.150 
For example, Lawrence Kohlberg, in The Philosophy of 
Moral Development, offers insight into the development of an 
individual from childhood to adulthood.151 In his moral 
judgment development theory,152 Kohlberg identified six 
frameworks (also referred to as stages) in which human beings 
address moral issues.153 Kohlberg discovered that moral 
 
148. Id. at 249 (indicating that “development of formal operational 
thought and the development of more advanced perspective-taking abilities” 
are two of these other developing competencies). 
149. See Scharf, supra note 80, at 214-15. 
150. Smetana & Turiel, supra note 144, at 248. 
 
Eisenberg and her colleagues have examined an aspect of 
moral reasoning – prosocial judgments – that they believed 
was omitted in the previous research focusing on reasoning 
about rules and prohibitions. Gilligan and her colleagues 
also have focused on aspects of morality they believed were 
ignored in previous work – caring (as opposed to justice) in 
interpersonal relationships. 
 
Id. 
151. See 1 LAWRENCE KOHLBERG, ESSAYS ON MORAL DEVELOPMENT: THE 
PHILOSOPHY OF MORAL DEVELOPMENT 16-22 (1981) [hereinafter ESSAYS ON 
MORAL DEVELOPMENT]. See also Mitchell, supra note 1, at 499. Granted, 
Kohlberg also recognized that autonomous moral reasoning does not 
necessarily lead to good behavior but determined that it most frequently did. 
WILLIAM K. KILPATRICK, WHY JOHNNY CAN’T TELL RIGHT FROM WRONG 102 
(1992). Kohlberg’s case for moral development beyond childhood has been 
referred to as the leading work. David Moshman, Developmental Change in 
Adulthood, in HANDBOOK OF ADULT DEVELOPMENT, supra note 141, at 51 
(2003). 
152. See TIANLONG YU, IN THE NAME OF MORALITY 50-51 (2004) 
(discussing developmentalists, particularly Kohlberg’s, emphasis on moral 
judgment). 
153. Kohlberg identifies these frameworks in his 1984 work THE 
PSYCHOLOGY OF MORAL DEVELOPMENT. See Moshman, supra note 151, at 51-
52 (brief discussion of these frameworks and their application). Kohlberg’s six 
stages are as follows: 
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reasoning increases in intellectual complexity and moral 
principle the further along the stages an individual moves.154 
The sixth stage is the most morally principled, while the first 
stage is the least. He identified another level of development 
beyond Piaget’s theory of moral development of the child, 
labeled “post-conventional.”155 At this level, the human being 
engages in the principled moral judgments.156 Kohlberg’s 
research and theory have been used as evidence that human 
beings can progress in moral development into adolescence and 
adulthood.157 “Significantly, Kohlberg’s data suggest that Stage 
5 moral reasoning is used by less than 20 percent of adult 
Americans and by few adolescents, although it can be 
understood intuitively by a larger proportion of people.”158 
Kohlberg recognized the role of moral education in the 
development of moral individuals and institutions.159 He 
viewed moral development as the product of “increasing ability 
 
 
[a]t Stage 1, law is conceived as the force of the powerful, to 
which the weaker must submit. At Stage 2, right action 
becomes that which satisfies one’s own needs: law is 
thought of in terms of the rules of expedience or a naive [sic] 
rational hedonism…. Stage 3 offers what is called the good 
boy/girl orientation: law becomes associated with collection 
opinion; one obeys the law because that is what others 
expect. At Stage 4, there is a shift toward fixed definitions of 
law and society: the law is justified by its order-maintaining 
function… Stage 5 is a legalistic-contract orientation: law 
becomes the agreed-upon contract among social equals with 
duties of state and individual clearly defined and regulated. 
At Stage 6, Kohlberg argues that there is a universal basis 
for ethical decision-making: the law is the repository for 
broader social principles and is subordinate where law and 
justice conflict. 
 
Scharf, supra note 80, at 215. 
154. See Ralph L. Mosher, Funny Things Happen on the Way to School 
Democracy, in DEVELOPMENT OF MORAL REASONING, supra note 67, at 84 
(1980). 
155. ESSAYS ON MORAL DEVELOPMENT, supra note 151, at 18. 
156. Smetana & Turiel, supra note 144, at 249. 
157. See Moshman, supra note 151, at 51. 
158. See Mosher, supra note 154, at 84. 
159. See id. at 85. 
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to perceive social reality or to organize and integrate social 
experience.”160 His theory underscores the importance of the 
social environment to stimulate progress in moral reasoning.161 
He held that the problem responsible for the latent capacity for 
full moral reasoning is that human thought must be provoked 
by experiences, particularly through interactions in a 
democratic and equitable community.162 The child’s and 
adolescent’s educational experience is a large part of his or her 
social experience. “As it comes into contact with education, 
ethics as a discourse about principles is transformed into an 
applied morality.”163 Unfortunately, as Kohlberg pointed out, 
many teachers are not aware of the role they have in moral 
education and do not have training or clear views on the 
concept.164 Kohlberg also recognizes the value of a system of 
“checks and balances” to support rights and protect against 
behavior by individuals who have not fully moved through the 
six stages of moral development.165 Kohlberg explains that the 
role of the educating environment “depend[s] upon the value-
perspective of functional sociology, the perspective that the 
invisible hand of societal survival guides the shaping of human 
institutions and gives them a value or wisdom not apparent at 
first glance.”166 
This urges that, like a natural person, the corporate person 
is in continual moral development and underscores the 
importance of the influence by the partner with which the 
collaborating entity chooses to engage in the Collaboration. 
 
160. ROBERT COLES, THE MORAL LIFE OF CHILDREN 26-27 (1986) (internal 
quotations omitted). 
161. See Scharf, supra notes 80, at 215. 
162. See Mosher, supra note 154, at 84-85. 
163. SHARON TODD, LEARNING FROM THE OTHER 5 (2003) (indicating that 
“education frequently becomes a practice through which ethical principles 
and ideals are made into concrete moral obligations, duties, and the like, and 
responsibility itself is based on the degree to which such obligations are 
fulfilled”). 
164. See Lawrence Kohlberg, Stages of Moral Development as a Basis for 
Moral Education, in MORAL DEVELOPMENT, MORAL EDUCATION, AND KOHLBERG 
18 (Brenda Munsey ed., 1980) [hereinafter MORAL EDUCATION]. 
165. See Lawrence Kohlberg, Educating for a Society, MORAL 
EDUCATION, supra note 164, at 457-61 (analyzing Nixon’s conduct in 
Watergate and recognizing the value of a system of “checks and balances”). 
166. MORAL EDUCATION, supra note 164, at 15, 19. 
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Research has shown that, through learning in Collaborations, 
for-profits’ social performance can be enhanced.167 The for-
profit and nonprofit in the Collaboration can be seen as 
educators to each other and should, therefore, respect their 
corresponding roles. “If we think of moral education as 
something carried on at the adult level, we recognize that the 
effective moral educator is something of a revolutionary rather 
as an instiller of virtues.”168 From this perspective, the 
collaborator in the Collaboration, the public and law makers 
may be viewed as part of the revolutionary model, continuing 
the guidance of the corporation in its moral development by 
offering democratic guidance with adequate flexibility.169 
 
IV. Conclusion 
 
Increased need has led to increased numbers of nonprofits, 
straining their already limited resources. Increased need, on 
the other hand, combined with the changing perspective on 
corporate value has created new opportunities for for-profit 
organizations to add value through cross-sector Collaboration 
with nonprofits. The Collaboration offers both the nonprofit 
and for-profit an opportunity to work together towards an 
identified philanthropic good. At play in the Collaboration 
sandbox, there are various stages on the Continuum at which 
the collaborators may engage. As the level of engagement 
becomes higher, so too does the need for the management to be 
involved so as to properly exercise their duty of care, decision-
making, and oversight. Since the cross-sector Collaboration 
offers a new opportunity for both types of entities to advocate 
for the good and to develop as entrepreneurs, the law in this 
area continues to experience parallel changes and 
 
167. See Bindu Arya & Jane E. Salk, Cross-Sector Alliance Learning and 
Effectiveness of Voluntary Codes of Corporate Social Responsibility, 16 BUS. 
ETHICS Q. 211, 228 (2006) (indicating that it is important to align government 
policies with cross-sector codes of conduct to improve corporate social 
performance through learning). 
168. MORAL EDUCATION, supra 164, at 65. But see ALBERT BANDURA, 
SOCIAL LEARNING THEORY (1977) (providing a differing view to Kohlberg’s 
model of development). 
169. See, e.g., supra note 168. 
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enhancements. Given the unique characteristics of a for-profit 
and nonprofit collaborating together and the evolving nature of 
the sandbox of Collaborations, the management of both entities 
must pay particular attention to their effective rendering of the 
duty of care. Depending on the level of integration of the 
Collaboration along the Continuum, the for-profit, given its 
knowledge of profit generating business and access to more 
resources, may consider whether the nonprofit’s management 
is fulfilling their oversight and decision making function in an 
informed and responsible manner. This is particularly true if 
the Collaboration is successful in promoting its goals of 
fundraising for the philanthropic mission. If proper care is not 
directed towards the nonprofit, the sustainability of the 
nonprofit itself may be called into question due to mission drift, 
possible improper conduct by management, and problems with 
the IRS. The risks for negative consequences to the nonprofit 
increase the further along the Continuum if steps are not taken 
to counter the effects of the Collaboration on the culture and 
mission of the nonprofit.170 
With Piaget’s moral development theory as a guide, his 
Article establishes that a for-profit should view the 
sustainability of the collaborating nonprofit as a responsibility 
under its own duty of care further along the Continuum. This 
responsibility focuses on the unique influences of the 
Collaboration on the nonprofit and ensures that the nonprofit 
does not abuse the tax-exempt status, commit fraud or other 
illegal conduct, and maintains adequate measures in place to 
continue pursuit of the mission. Jean Piaget’s theory provides 
considerable insight into how to manage the relationship 
between the for-profit and nonprofit in the Collaboration. The 
deeper into the Continuum and the more cross-efforts by 
management of the entities, the greater the need for guidance 
from the for-profit to the nonprofit as improved results are 
achieved and, on the other hand, the greater the potential for 
paternalistic conduct by the for-profit and regulation by law 
makers to the point of constraint on the moral development of 
both entities in the Collaboration. This would be contrary to 
the intended results of the Collaboration and to the greater 
 
170. Austin & Reficco, supra note 5, at 90. 
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good of society. 
Both a nonprofit and for-profit corporation entering into a 
Collaboration seek promotion of a philanthropic good and some 
degree of development of their organization. In particular, the 
for-profit seeks improvement of good will from associating with 
the nonprofit, and the nonprofit seeks access to more funds and 
capabilities. The Piaget moral development theory prescribes 
an approach to the Collaboration which emphasizes one of 
cooperation, equity, and mutual respect. While a child usually 
outgrows the constraint by the rules and establishes his or her 
own autonomy, a corporation is always bound by constraint, 
including the rules applicable to corporate governance.171 This 
would advocate in favor of a middle ground for regulation, 
where there is guidance but not overly constrictive rules. 
Piaget’s theory of moral development applies to the 
behavior of children and, as such, does not necessarily directly 
parallel the moral development of corporate entities in the 
Collaboration.172 However, the core tenants of Piaget’s moral 
development theory—cooperation and mutual respect or 
constraint and unilateralism—shed light on and offer guidance 
related to implementation of corporate governance standards 
and the corresponding duty of care. We see the concepts play 
out in the Collaboration’s interactions. Further, corporate 
governance itself generally relates to a tug-of-war between 
constraint and freedom: constraint from management’s 
opportunism and freedom for management to make business 
decisions. 
 
 
171. See Mitchell, supra note 1, at 480. 
172. See Id. at 499. 
 
It would be silly to argue that direct parallels exist between 
corporate behavior and children's behavior, and I do not 
attempt to do so. Instead, I have tried to draw one of the 
central insights from Piaget's work to show how it 
illuminates important problems in corporate law. This 
central insight concerns the effects of constraint and 
cooperation on moral development and growth. 
 
Id. 
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